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Ratification of the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Georgia, 
Armenia  and  Azerbaijan  ,  which  were  signed  in  April  1996,  is  now  complete.  The 
Agreements are expected to enter into force  on 1 July 1999. An inaugural meeting with 
the  Presidents  of the  three  republics  is  foreseen  on  22  June  in  Luxembourg.  A 
reassessment of the EU's strategy towards the South Caucasus region, and of the most 
effective use of its instruments under the PCAs, is therefore timely; this is the principal 
objective of  this Communication. 
The  political  and  economic  developments  in  the  region  are  briefly  summarised.  The 
prospects  for  economic  reform  and  the  resumption of economic  activity,  given  the 
effects of  the "Russian crisis", and the links between these and internal political issues, in 
particular the lack of  progress on conflict resolution and the ongoing barriers to regional 
communications, are explored (section 2). 
EC  assistance  to  date  is  reviewed.  As  the economies of the  three  republics  develop, 
humanitarian aid is  playing a less significant role  in the Community's overall support. 
However,  new  instruments  have  been introduced  in the  form  of exceptional  financial 
assistance  and  rehabilitation;  at the  same  time  technical  assistance  through  Tacis  has 
become more focused on agreed policy objectives, with projects aiming at preparation for 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  PCAs  and  for  WTO  accession  negotiations  being 
systematically programmed.  Interstate  programmes,  in particular Traceca and  Inogate, 
have  become  important  tools  for  promoting  regional  cooperation.  The  mix  of 
instruments, and the debate concerning the renewal or modification of their legal bases, 
should reflect the EU's overall policy priorities.  Europe as  a whole  should be able to 
benefit from  the  development of the  South  Caucasus,  and from  EC  assistance to  the 
region (section 3). 
Furthermore, an analysis is made of what the EU can expect from its actions in the region 
under  the  PCAs.  Despite  the  efforts  of the  three  governments,  progress  on  the 
introduction  of the  rule  of law  and  the  market  economy  has  been  slow  and  the 
management of central government finances requires further improvement. The business 
climate is not yet sufficiently attractive.  At the same time, the threat to European security 
posed by instability in the Caucasus has if  anything tended to increase. The root of many 
of  the problems facing the three republics is the failure to resolve the ethnic conflicts; the 
present stalemate has aggravated humanitarian problems and has tended to  impede the 
development of democratic institutions  and of the market economy. This has reinforced 
the three republics' reliance on international assistance, while at the same time rendering 
that assistance less effective (section 4). 
The Communication therefore suggests that the EU needs to fashion its policy under the 
PCAs in such a way as to  ensure its actions and its assistance become an incentive to 
positive change. In the medium to  long term, relationships in which aid and assistance 
play a primary role need to develop into "two way" ones with reciprocal benefits for the 
European partners. 
2 In  conclusion,  actions  aimed  at  enhancing  regional  cooperation  and  post-conflict 
reconstruction  offer  the  best  option  for  progress  on  both  confidence-building  and 
economic recovery. These need political support through CFSP, and in particular through 
the institutions set up under the PCAs. Over time, for the EC's assistance to be effective 
progress must be made on the resolution of conflicts and the normalisation of political 
and economic life in the region.  The  22  June Presidential meeting will offer the three 
republics an important opportunity to demonstrate that the political will to make progress 
exists.  Bilateral technical assistance programming under the new Tacis regulation should 
become increasingly targeted on strengthening the rule of law, reinforcing the use of EC 
and international norms, improving fiscal management and the administration of  finances 
and improving the business climate (section 5). 
3 ----------------·-··-----· 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  In  its communication of May 19951,  the Commission proposed a  co-ordinated 
strategy to assist the three republics of the  South Caucasus through what was 
expected to be a lengthy transitional period, and to set the conditions for sustained 
development. 
It recommended that such a strategy should be based upon the negotiation, under 
appropriate conditions, of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with 
each republic, supplemented by food and humanitarian assistance and support for 
post-war reconstruction. It noted that such a strategy would give the Union very 
substantial  leverage  in  the  pursuit of its  overall  objectives,  including  conflict 
resolution and the promotion of  political and economic reform. 
Policy guidelines were subsequently endorsed by the General Affairs Council, on 
17 July 1995. 
1.2.  The PCAs were negotiated in 1995 and signed at a ceremony in Luxembourg in 
April  1996,  attended  by  Presidents  Ter-Petrossian  of  Armenia.  Aliev  of 
Azerbaijan and Shevardnadze of  Georgia. 
Ratification of the Agreements is now complete and they are  expected to  enter 
into  force  on  1 July  1999.  A  second meeting with the Presidents of the  three 
republics  has  been scheduled  for  Luxembourg,  on 22  June  1999  to  mark  the 
occasion. 
1.3.  The reassessment of  the EU's relations with the South Caucasus which is implied 
by the entry into force of  the PCAs comes at an important juncture: 
2 
3 
Following the Presidential elections held in Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
course of 1998, which gave rise to criticism on the part of  OSCE/ODIHR2 
and other international observers, parliamentary elections will be held in 
1999 in Armenia and Georgia. 
In late 1998 international efforts (UN and OSCE Minsk Group) to make 
progress in resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia,  and Nagomo-Karabakh. 
failed to achieve a breakthrough. 
Progress was achieved in 1998 through EU technical initiatives aimed at 
enhancing  regional  cooperation,  in  particular  the  Traccca  and  lnogatc 
programmes; but very little so  far  through  political  structures which  the 
countries of  the region have established (CIS, BSEC, ECO)J. 
As of September 1998, the economies of the countries of the region have 
been  seriously  affected  by  the  Russian  crisis  and  in  particular  by  the 
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4 d~~valuation of the rouble. Azerbaijan and Georgia were also affected 
lower than expected revenues for energy exports, due to lov.1 world prices. 
However, "early" Caspian oil is being exported via the Caucasian conidor, 
and the first pipeline to bring oil from Baku to Supsa, on the Black Sea, 
was officially opened in April 1999. 
The search for a regional solution to energy problems has been rendered 
still more urgent  by the EU's insistence that the Medzamor nuclear power 
station  in  Armenia  be  closed.  An  EC-Armenia  Working  Group  is 
mandated to draw up a report. 
It  is  hoped  that  Georgia  and  Armenia  will  complete  negotiations  for 
accession to the World Trade Organisation in the course of 1999. 
Georgia's application to join the Council of  Europe has just been accepted. 
1.4.  Almost all  the economic  measures  recommended  in  the  1995  Communication 
have since been progressively implemented. With the impending entry into f()rcc 
of the PCAs - which will for the first time offer the EU a common platform t(1r 
dialogue on political, commercial and assistance issues - a further examination is 
required, which should go beyond an analysis of existing assistance instruments 
and their role in encouraging political and economic reform. This communication 
is therefore intended as a review of  strategy, including an assessment of: 
•  the economic and political benefit the EU is  deriving from  its actions in the 
South Caucasus, 
•  wheth~r  the EU's means of  intervention are appropriate to the circumstances, 
•  what new initiatives are required, in the broader context of  the PC  As. 
5 . i 
SUMMARY REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 
Armenia 
2.1.  Armenia has been able to capitalise on the homogeneity of its society and culture. 
and  to  draw  on  a  reservoir  of efficient  (including  a  number  of American  or 
European-trained) administrators and business-people. The Government appears 
to  remain· committed  to  reform  and  to  IMF-inspired  policies.  President 
Kocharian's intention is  now to  support Western-inspired regional  cooperation 
initiatives. · 
2.2.  The government has hitherto been able to protect itself, through strong fiscal and 
monetary policies, from a major outflow of  resources in order to protect the Dram 
against the effects of  -the  devaluation of the  rouble.  In  this,  Armenia has  been 
notably more successful than its neighbours. The Prime Minister has made it clear 
that  this  success may be  of short duration,  but he  appears confident that with 
international assistance, Armenia can balance its reform-oriented budget and this 
is the country's principal requirement at present. 
2.3.  Energy  shortages  have  been  a  fundamental  problem  for  successive  Armenian 
administrations. The recommissioning of the Medzamor nuclear power station in 
1995, with Russian assistance, has alleviated some of these problems. However, 
the EU has insisted that Armenia carry out its commitment to close the plant, on 
safety grounds,  by the year 2004.  The two sides  agreed  in December 1998  to 
establish a working group to prepare a comprehensive plan for the closure, as a 
basis for coordination with international donors. It is already clear that any plan 
must take into account the availability of new, reliable sources of conventional 
energy. This carries with it important implications for regional cooperation. 
2.4.  The Parliamentary elections set for 30 May 1999 will be an important indicator of 
the course Armenia will take in the coming. years and of its ability to meet PCA 
and Council <?f Europe criteria. 
Azerbaijan 
2.5.  Azerbaijan has from 1995 onwards, overcome the political instability which had 
dominated the  early.  years  of independence.  It has,  with considerable success, 
attracted investment from international oil companies, and has since 1995 reduced 
inflation to manageable levels and stabilised the currency. As a major beneficiary 
of EC aid, Azerbaijan has a close working relationship with the Union and its 
institutions. 
2.6.  However, this stability has been achieved at a price. The government of  President 
Aliev has imposed its authority by means which have been repeatedly criticised 
by  international  observers.  Meanwhile, · the  oil  sector  has . dominated  the 
government's strategy for economic revival, to the detriment of development in 
other sectors which are as important as oil for Azerbaijan's future- or possibly 
even more so, for example in the case of  agriculture. 
6 2.7.  The Presidential elections in October 1998 were widely considered to have taken 
place  under  conditions  which  did  not  fully  comply  OSCE  criteria.  However, 
although they were boycotted by a number of  opposition figures, they did provide 
a platform for the future development of  a credible opposition. 
2.8.  In  part  due  to  Azerbaijan's  relative  isolation  from  Russia  (Chechen  conflict, 
closure of frontier with Daghestan) the effects of  the- economic crisis are not yet 
fully  apparent.  How.ever,  Russia accounts  for  20 % of Azerbaijan's trade  and 
th~re are  ~lieved to_  be  more  than a  million Azeris working  there.  The  vast 
majority of  Azeris are still_ extremely poor. There are more than 800,000 refugees 
and IDPs from Nagomo-Karabagh and the surrounding territories occupied by NK 
forces,  many still living in deprived conditions in camps, and these represent a 
huge burden on the state. 
2.9.  Income from offshore concessions (estimated by Azerbaijan at more than$ 30 bn) 
has provided an important cushion against revenue shortfalls. But prospects for 
the  oil  sector  remain  uncertain.  Whereas  prices  have  risen  recently,  and  are 
currently above $15 a barrel, wells in some concessions have proved barren (the 
CIPCO  and  NAOC  consortia  have  already  withdrawn)  and  there  is  still 
disagreement  over  the  "main  export  pipeline".  Azerbaijan  expects  to  be 
completely self-supporting by 1003-,  but it is  still unclear to what extent these 
hope!  will  be  r•aUied.  Mtlreo\'ef,  as yet  oftly  the  Al0C4 has  built,  and  will 
control, export pipelines to the West. This is a matter of eonsiderable economic 
significance in view of  Azerbaijan's efforts to maximise its export potential. 
2.1 0.  The  Community  and  other  donors  have  sought  in  recent  years  to  overcome 
administrative, cultural and political impediments to the further modernisation of 
Azerbaijan's  government  apparatus  and  to  the  liberalisation  of state-owned 
commercial enterprises. This process is vital for the development of a true market 
economy in a country where-the introduction of  new norms and practices has been 
difficult and slow. 
2.11.  Thus,  there  is  a  risk that the  window of opportunity  offered  by  Azerbaijan's 
potential oil wealth may, at least in the short term, close without major progress 
on any of  the country's major objectives: alleviation of  poverty, especially outside 
Baku and in the refugee camps; opening of borders following a settlement of the 
Nagomo-Karabagh conflict; return of the refugees; realisation of oil revenues in 
the short term; diversification of  the economy; tackling corruption, and the major 
disincentives  to  trade  and  investment;  improvement  of administration  and  in 
particular its ability to manage central government finances;  and realisation of 
Baku's potential as a communications hub. 
4  Azerbaijan International Operating Company. The first and largest consortium to exploit offshore oil 
reserves in the Caspian. 
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Georgia 
2.12.  Georgia's recovery from the political and economic turmoil of  the early 1990s 
been remarkable. In 1993 the survival of the country was in question; by 1996 ;; 
had  a  freely  elected  president  and  parliament,  a  new constitution,  and  a 
convertible currency.  Its  efforts to  create a genuinely democratic  system  have 
been  more  successful  than  those  of many  of its  neighbours.  In  1996-97  the 
economic growth ratewas among the highest in the former Soviet Union, and it 
seemed as  if the  perennial problems  of energy  and  food  shortages were  being 
overcome. In 1999 Georgia has acceded to  the Council of Europe and is  set to 
join the WTO. 
The  President  has  acknowledged  the  key  role  played  by  the  Union,  both  in 
ensuring Georgia's survival in 1994-96 through food and humanitarian aid, and in 
helping to set the framework for ongoing reform through technical assistance. He 
has specified that Georgia's foreign policy must be based upon an intensification 
of relations with the EU and other European institutions. 
2.13.  In  1998,  however,  the  Russian  crisis  demonstrated the  scale  of the  problems 
whic"Q  remain.  The  country has had to  cope  with a heavy refugee  burden,  the 
unresolved conflicts with Abkhazia and  South Ossetia and the consequences of 
drought. It has thus had few resources with which to mitigate the social effects of 
devaluation of the Russian rouble.  These are  proving particularly serious given 
Georgia's reliance on trade with Russia (which accounted for 30% of exports in 
1997) and on remittances from Georgians working in Russia. 
2.14.  Moreover, the crisis has revealed serious underlying concerns which need to be 
tackled  at  source  : pervasive  corruption;  strong  resistance  in the  provinces  to 
control  from  Tbilisi;  and unreformed  administration,  especially in the revenue 
departments (tax, customs). Georgia's revenue collection rate was worryingly low 
in  1998, especially in the second half of the year, and is the lowest in the former 
USSR.  This  has  led  to  a major  loss  of credibility  with  international  financing 
institutions and has delayed disbursement of EC  assistance linked to  compliance 
with IMF programmes. As a result, President Shevardnadze's principal need is at 
the  moment for  additional financial  support to  pay  salaries  and  pensions.  He 
makes  no  secret  of his  fear  that  without  this  support,  there  may  be  a  social 
explosion which could lead to the collapse of  the Government. 
2.15.  The  local  elections  of November  1998  showed  that  many  voters  have  been 
alienated by the government's seeming inability to cope with Georgia's economic 
and internal political problems. The Parliamentary elections due  in Autumn of 
1999 will be  an  important test of the President's popularity.  A wide range of 
interests inside Georgia. oppose his efforts to  modernise the state and to  crack 
down on corruption and tax  evasion, for reasons which range from the wish to 
preserve or acquire local autonomies to organised crime. It is undeniable that the 
failure to  resolve the conflict in Abkhazia has encouraged local separatism, and 
that certain parts of  the country are effectively outside central government control. 
Furthermore,  it  is  widely  believed  in  Georgia that certain forces  in Russia arc 
taking full  advantage of this situation to  interfere in Georgia's affairs,  and  the 
Georgian government has  stated that it sees the continued presence of Russian 
8 bases,  without  the  agreement  of the  Georgian  Parliament,  as  a  destabilising 
element. 
2.16.  Thus despite his important achievements, President Shevardnadze - who is now 
over 70  and has  survived assassination attempts in 1995  and  1998 - still faces 
many of the same centrifugal forces in  1999 as he did in 1993.  Yet Georgia is 
Europe's gateway to the Caspian and Central Asia; it is the first Caucasian countrv 
to accede to the Council of  Europe, and the only Newly Independent State which 
has  already  started  the  process  of  harmonising  its  legislation  with  European 
norms.  Thus, developments there are of particular relevance to  the EU's policy 
towards the region as a whole. 
The conflicts 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
2.17.  It  has  been  an  objective  of Armenian  diplomacy  to  persuade  international 
mediators to put forward peace proposals without "preconditions" (a reference to 
the conclusions of the Lisbon OSCE Summit of December 1996, which inter alia 
reiterated the principle of Azerbaijani territorial integrity; these conclusions were 
not accepted by Armenia). The peace plan put forward by the co-chairmen of the 
OSCE Minsk Group (France,  Russia and  US)  in  1997  would have  instituted a 
normalisation process, including the demilitarisation of the occupied territories, 
while  leaving  the  issues  of political  status  and  links  with  Armenia  for  later. 
Although the then President, Mr Ter Petrossian, was prepared to accept this as a 
basis  for  discussion,  he  thereby  lost  the  support  of those  in  Armenia  who 
considered that it would preempt a settlement on the political status of  Nagorno-
Karabagh.  Among  these  was  the  Prime  Minister,  Robert  Kocharian,  formerly 
"President" of Nagorno-Karabagh. When Mr Ter Petrossian resigned in February 
1998, Mr Kocharian was elected President of  Armenia. 
The proposals put forward by the Minsk Group co-chairs in 1998 were based on a 
comprehensive  package,  and  they  secured  the  support  of  the  Armenian 
government. However, the proposed definition of the enclave's status ("common 
state") was rejected by Azerbaijan as going too far towards parity between Baku 
and Stepanakert. In February 1999, Russia confirmed that it has delivered surface 
to  air missiles  and  fighter  aircraft to  Armenia;  following  this,  President Aliev 
appealed to the Presidents of  France, Russia and the US to intervene personally in 
order to re-launch the peace process on a new basis. 
It would thus appear that in both 1997 and  1998, the Minsk Group co-chairmen 
have  had  difficulty  in  devising  an  approach  which  both  sides  could  consider 
sufficiently balanced as to serve as a common basis for further negotiations. The 
Minsk Group's failure to achieve progress since 1994 has laid it  open to criticism 
in the region and from the international community. 
9 Ahkhazia 
2.1 R.  The key points at issue in the Abkhazian conflict are the conditions "for the retm 
to  their homes of some  300.000 ethnic Georgian refugees and IDPs, who  we  , 
forced to leave the region in the 1992-93 war. They substantially outnumbe:: 
nationalities  remaining  in  Abkhazia,  and  any  solution to  the  conflict, 
Abkhazia's status within the internationally recognised borders of Georgia, would 
require the identity, rights and security of all ethnic groups to be protected. 
is as yet no expectation that the Abkhazian authorities can be freely persuaded to 
accept Georgian territorial integrity as a principle, nor the return en masse of the 
refugees. The situation deteriorated in May 1998 when Abkhazian forces expelled 
30.000-40.000  Georgians  who  had  resettled  in  the  Gali  area.  The  Abkhaz 
authorities have begun processing the return of  refugees themselves, as of March 
1999, but in the absence of any agreement on the conditions under which this 
should  take  place.  Face-to-face  talks,  complemented  by  a  formal  structure  of 
committees on each of the key  issues set up under the aegis of the UN  and by 
conferences on confidence-building measures have continued. It was hoped that a 
protocol on the conditions for the return of refugees to Gali, brokered by the UN 
with Russia as "facilitator" and with the assistance of  the group of "Friends of  the 
UN Secretary-General", would be signed at the end of 1998, but this has not yet 
proved possible. 
South Ossetia 
2.19.  The Georgian government's discussions with the South Ossetian authorities (and 
also  those  of the  Russian  republic  of North  Ossetia)  have  made  progress  on 
refugee  return  and  on  economic  cooperation,  with  Russian  participation.  In 
February 1999, both parties agreed the text of an "Interim Document". Working 
groups have been created to develop proposals for  its implementation, and the 
OSCE convened a session of the Joint Control Commission in March 1999. It 
remains  to  be  seen whether this  will  lead  directly to  a political  settlement on 
status issues. 
10 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S ASSISTANCE TO DATE 
3 .1.  The EU has spent very considerable sums of money in the region.  EC  grant aid 
alone amounts to €  845  million, from  independence to the end of 1998 - even 
without counting regional programmes like Inogate and Tracecas.  Much of this 
has been in the form of  targeted emergency aid, direct food aid and rehabilitation 








Since 1996,  with the exception of  the exceptional assistance foreseen in 1999 for 
countries affected by the Russian crisis (see para 3.11  below) humanitarian aid 
has  played  an  increasingly  less  significant  role  in  the  EC'  s  assistance 
programmes6. Direct food aid has been superseded by food security programmes 
aimed  at  enhancing  sustainability.  In  parallel,  the  counterpart  funds  raised  in 
1995-96 by sales of EC food aid continue to be recycled in the form of loans to 
private  farmers,  and  this  has  been  one  of the  most  effective  forms  of EC 
assistance. Food security programmes are subject to a number of conditionalities; 
this is particularly important given that they take the form of budgetary transfers. 
Clear accountability all along the chain is required (reforms in place; transfer into 
the budget, and from the budget to the agricultural sector, conformity with IMF 
programmes)  which is  why delays  in  disbursement have  occurred in all  three 
countries, and especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
In 1997 two new instruments became available. The Caucasus became eligible for 
support under the Rehabilitation regulation7,  and the Council and the European 
Parliament approved exceptional  financial  assistance for  Georgia and Armenia, 
which allowed them to contract new 15 year loans, with grant support, providing 
that  all  outstanding  financial  obligations  towards  the  EC  were  settled  and 
commitments taken on through IMF-supported reform  programmes respected8. 
These countries are now fully current on their financial  obligations towards the 
Community.  The  Budgetary  Authority  has  however  not  been  in  a  position  to 
provide part of  the grant finance foreseen in the Council Decision; this has led to 
problems  with  implementation  and  may  thus  delay  the  reduction  of  the 
Community's financial exposure. 
The provision of exceptional EC financial assistance to Armenia and Georgia led 
Azerbaijan to  request comparable treatment.  In  1998  the  Council  endorsed the 
principle of additional assistance through existing EC  instruments.  This is  now 
being implemented with Tacis funding. 
The 1998  10 Mecu special assistance programme for Azerbaijan is an innovative 
response to Azerbaijan's needs. Funds are transferred to a special bank account, 
from which tranches are released as and when viable projects are identified. The 
It  is  difficult  and  misleading to  try  to  break  down  the  benefits  of regional  programmes  between 
individual participating countries. 
Despite  ECHO's  interventions  in  1998,  in  Georgia  following  the  expulsions  from  Gali  and  in 
Azerbaijan following the earthquake in the Lerik and Yardimli regions. 
'  . 
Council regulation 2258/96 of22.11.1996 
Council Decision 97  /787/EC of 17.11.97 
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.. projects must be coherently linked with the Tacis Indicative Programme and with 
EC activities under the Rehabilitation Regulation. Contracts are awarded locally. 
The  Commission  has  proposed  that  the  new  "Tacis"  regulation  include 
possibility of special support programmes in the event of unforeseen political 
economic crises.  Such programmes would not take the form of macro-financ1;_d 
assistance, but could be used to  help reduce the burden of local expenditure for 
humanitarian projects or for the continued functioning of essential services. This 
kind of project would be  seen, as  the  1998  spechll programme in Azerbaijan is 
seen, as making a direct contribution to the local economy while sirimltaneously 
conferring high visibility upon the EC. 
3.5.  Although the EU has no instruments directly addressing conflict resolution, it has 
launched rehabilitation projects in Georgia and Azerbaijan whose purpose is to 
begin the  process of post-conflict reconstruction.  The  Commission is  currently 
seeking to accelerate the implementation of the projects the EC has launched in 
South Ossetia and at the Inguri dam  and power station,  on the border between 
Abkhazia  and  the  rest  of Georgia.  It has  also  sponsored  meetings  between 
Georgian and Abkhazian academics where issues relating to  the conflict and  to 
federal  structures have  been discussed in a non-confrontational  atmosphere.  In 
Azerbaijan,  the  Fizuli  and  Agdarn  projects  are  perhaps  the  most  visible  and 
effective of  all EC initiatives in the country. 
3.6.  Tacis. is the only form of financial  assistance which is explicitly foreseen in the 
PCAs.  Since 1996 Tacis has been used increasingly to meet policy objectives, in 
particular those endorsed by the Council in July 1995. Thus projects now exist in 
all  three  countries  which  foresee  the  progressive  establishment  of European 
Policy  and  Legal  Advice  Centres,  aimed  at  the  transposition  into  national 
legislation of international commitments taken on through the PCAs and WTO 
membership.  The  EPLACs' work on the PCAs is  concentrating on three broad 
priority areas: the OSCE and UN principles, which are incorporated by reference; 
European  norms,  referred  to  in·  the  legislative  approximation  article;  and 
investment-related  provisions  (establishment  and  operation  of  companies, 
protection of  intellectual property, and movement of  capital). 
Major projects have also been hmnched which aim at strengthening democratic 
institutions and the rule of law. These include projects on the training of  judges 
(Georgia and Armenia) assisting parliament (Georgia) and reform of central and 
local  government administrations. 
3.7.  Tacis  has  already  launched  a  number  of important  initiatives  m  regional 
cooperation which have made progress in 1998. It has: 
- facilitated  the  negotiation  of the  Basic  Multilateral  International  Transport 
Agreement (MTA) which fixes tariffs and facilitates procedures for trade on the 
Traceca route.  This  was  endorsed  in Baku  last  September.  Traceca  has  thus 
moved forward from the technical assistance phase to the phase of  support for the 
implementation  of the  MT  A,  which  was  signed  by  the  heads  of state  or 
government of  twelve countries, including the Prime Minister of  Armenia. 
- used  Inogate  to  promote  an  "umbrella agreement"  creating  a  framework  for 
settling  disputes  on jurisdiction  over  pipelines,  especially  where  they  cross 
borders. This is essential in order to attract investment. Participants initialled the 
12 UA  on  17  February  1999  at  the  Inogate  Conference,  and  Heads  of State  are 
expected  to  sign  the  document  in  Kiev  on  22  July  1999.  The  EC's  Synergy 
programme, in cooperation with the Energy Charter Secretariat, has also launched 
a project focusing on the implementation of the transit provisions of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. 
- prepared a feasibility study on Transcaspian pipelines. 
- launched  projects  in  the  field  of Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  including  drug 
trafficking,  in Central  Asia; these  could,  as  appropriate,  be  complemented by 
projects in the South Caucasus. 
- The region has also benefited from environmental projects, including projects on 
mitigating pollution in the Black and Caspian Seas and on developing common 
environmental policies. A Regional Environment Centre is to be established in 
Tbilisi, with EC support. 
3.8.  Three new initiatives are under consideration: 
- the possibility of using Traceca to help rehabilitate the Baku-Nakhichevan and 
Yerevan-Julfa railways. This is still under discussion. 
- the construction of  a fibre-optic telecommunications network along the main rail 
axes in the Caucasus (Baku-Tbilisi and Tbilisi-Yerevan). 
- possible use of the Tacis Interstate Programme for eventual north-south links 
(Russia-Georgia)  via  Abkhazia.  These  could  include  transport,  energy  and 
telecommunications. 
3.9.  By way of illustration of the current trend in EC assistance away from aid and 
towards  PCA-guided  development,  it  will  be  noted  that  in  1996,  earmarked 
humanitarian and food-related support accounted for 84% of  total grant aid. Tacis 
accounted for 16 %. Rehabilitation accounted for only 2 %.  9 
9 
In  FY  (financial  year)  1998,  Tacis  will  account for  28  %:1o,  rehabilitation  for 
12%11 and humanitarian and food-related support for 47 %: 
Included in the 1996-97 Tacis Action Programme for Azerbaijan : rehabilitation in the Fizuli district 
1  o  Including I 0 M€ exceptional Tacis programme for Azerbaijan 




EU Assistance to the Caucasus, FY 1998 :  Mill. Ecu 
Georgia  Armenia 
-"  Azerbaijan  Total 
Tacis  8.00  5.00  8.00- 21.00 
Except. Tacis  10.00  10.00 
Food Security  14.00  12.00  14.00  40.00 
ECHO  6.41  1.60  4.40  12.41 
Except. Financial  9.00  8.00  17.00 
assistance (grant 
component accompanying 
15 year loan) 
Rehabilitation  6.50  4.50  11.00 
Total grant aid  43.91  .26.60  40.90  111.41 
In  addition, the South Caucasian states have been important beneficiaries of the Tacis 
Interstate  programmes.  Some  l 0 mn Euros were  allocated to Traceca and  12  mn  for 
Inogate in 1998 , but it is difficult to distinguish how much of  this went to the region. 
3.10.  Thus  the  Commission  considers  that  for  the  moment,  EC  assistance  should 
continue  to  take  the . form  of a  mix  of short  and  medium  term  measures, 
combining humanitarian and  food  related support with Tacis projects targeting 
financial  management, administrative changes and improvement in the business 
climate. The latter includes the enforcement of individual and treaty rights under 
domestic law.  · 
In the medium term, assistance should however become increasingly related to, in 
the first instance, conflict resolution and subsequent "normalisation", as well as to 
those obligations laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of  the PCAs. Due note should be 
taken of  the political obligations taken on by the three countries under the terms 
of their eventual accession to the Council of Europe, and also to the economic 
obligations taken on under agreements with international financing institutions. 
3  .11.  By the year 2000, the Tacis  regulation will need to be renewed. 1999 will also be 
the final year of the current triannual food security programmes in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. ECHO is pursuing its policy of gradual withdrawal, and has already 
closed its office in Yerevan.  Nevertheless, the Community decided to provide 20 
mn  Euros  of exceptional  assistance  in  1999  to  the  NIS,  including  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, to  address additional humanitarian needs related to the 
effects of the  "Russian"  crisis.  The  Commission will  keep  the  situation under 
review.  The  future  needs  of the  Caucasus  should  be  an· integral  part  of the 
Community's  planning  for  the  first  decade  of  the  21st  century. A  number .of 




I reflected in the Commission's proposal for the new "Tacis" regulation - not least 
·the added emphasis on the use of  this instrument to promote regional cooperation. 
Moreover, as noted in the Commission's communication on the Black Seal2, it is 
important that  this  assistance,  particularly  in the  field  of regional  cooperation, 
does not take place in a vacuum. It needs to be co-ordinated with other policies, 
and cooperation initiatives extended as appropriate westwards, if the EU and its 
neighbours are to benefit fully from the resulting synergies. 
ASSESSMENT 
4.1.  Much of the EC's assistance in the years since the cease-fires in Abkhazia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh has been short term in nature.  In the longer term, however, 
and in the context of  the PC As the Commission takes the view that financial and 
technical assistance should aim to assist the beneficiaries to create the conditions 
needed for the mutual and reciprocal obligations of  PCAs to be met. 
4.2.  The texts of the PCAs imply that the South Caucasian republics should become 
modern,  self-reliant,  democratic  market  economies,  in  the  sense  that  their 
legislation should be based  upon political (OSCE and Council of Europe) and 
economic (EC and WTO) norms. 
The  PCAs  institute  a  process  of "rapprochement"  between  the  EU  and  the 
Caucasus.  The  EU  requires  the  partner  countries  to  complete  the  transition 
process,  both  in  the political and  economic spheres. The conditions need to  be 
created which would allow the EU to develop its role as a trade and investment 
partner. In parallel, partners should fully contribute towards reinforcing European 
security,  in  the  region  and  beyond.  In  short,  not  only economic  reform  but 
"normalisation" is an effective precondition for the successful implementation of 
the PCAs. 
4.3.  Any assessment of progress so far must recognise that important successes have 
been achieved. Thus, Georgia has pulled back from the abyss it faced in 1993-94; 
it has created a democratic system of government and has been able to stabilise 
the Lari both in  1995  and in  1998-99.  Armenia has been able to  build upon its 
early reforms to  ensure continuity in economic policy and to  create an efficient 
central administration, despite its lack of resources and its geographical isolation. 
Azerbaijan has, for the present, overcome the political instability of 1992-96 and 
has set in the hand the development of potentially huge energy resources in the 
Caspian. 
4.4.  Yet a huge amount of  work still needs to be done: 
a)  The introduction of the market economy is still slow, as throughout the 
former USSR. In the Caucasus macro-economic stability h~d been largely 
achieved  by  1995-96.  Yet  large-scale  privatisation  programmes  onty 
began to  be systematically implemented in  1998.  Reforms  have in  each 
l2  "Regional cooperation in the Black Sea area': COM(97)597 of  14.11.1997 
15 case not been implemented evenly throughout the cou..'1try,  1s  a 
growing disparity between the regions and the more affluent capital  citie~. 
The  process  of introducing  international  norms  is  more  advance,;:, 
Georgia and Armenia, thanks in part to the WTO process. Yet so far o::· , 
Georgia has stated explicitly that its policy is to incorporate EC norms  int~. 
the legislative process, and has taken measures to implement this poL:y 
Azerbaijan is still at the first stage of the WTO accession process. In  aU 
three  countries,  but  especially  Azerbaijan,  further  work  is  needed  to 
introduce modem accounting systems. 
b)  The "Russian crisis" has highlighted the need to remedy the  defects or 
existing administrative mechanisms for  collecting and spending revenue. 
Reform of the customs and taxation services is now necessary in Georgia, 
and  Armenia too  has  recognised  this.  In  Azerbaijan  such  reforms  are 
equally needed. 
c)  These  financial  problems  are  inseparable  from  the  overall  business 
climate. Corruption, red tape, unreformed standards, and lack of judicial 
recourse lead the lists of complaints put forward by European businesses. 
But  they  also  stifle  initiative  on  the  part  of domestic  producers  and 
service-providers, and nowhere more than in the key agricultural sector. 
For these reasons the Commission has identified the administration of tax 
and customs and the judiciary as the targets of  current and future technical 
assistance. 
d)  ln none of the Caucasian republics is the rule of law assured. As yet,  no 
strong, independent judiciaries and audit institutions exist. 
e)  There  is  a  general  recognition  in  the  Caucasus  that  for  the  future 
development  open  borders  and  increased  market  access  are 
indispensable. Yet Georgia still cannot access its principal trading partner, 
Russia,  via  Abkhazia;  Armenia's  borders  with  Turkey  and  Azerbaijan 
remain closed, leaving Yerevan dependent on poor-quality land routes to 
Georgia and Iran. Azerbaijan is in ongoing dispute with Turkmenistan and 
Iran and its relations with Russia are worse than at any time since the May 
1994  cease-fire.  Politically,  according  to  analysts,  the  countries  of the 
region are, if anything, even more isolated now than they were five years 
ago. Hence the strong support demonstrated by all three governments for 
non-political economic cooperation initiatives, of  which the EC's Traceca 
and Inogate programmes are the pre-eminent examples. 
f)  The threat to European security posed by instability in the Caucasus in 
the larger sense has increased, given the links between the conflicts and 
the politics of  energy in the region. Russia's alliance with, and its military 
assistance to,  Armenia have served to  reinforce Azerbaijan's resentment 
against  Russia  and  to  strengthen  its  informal  alliance  with  Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova ("GUUAM"). Russia has not been able 
to reach agreement with Baku on the jurisdictional issues telating to  the 
control of  the Caspian and its resources. Despite Lukoil' s membership of 
the AIOC, Russia has hitherto opposed the construction of  pipelines which 
do  not pass through her tenitory, and  in particular the US  and Turkish-
backed proposal  to build a pipeline  from  Baku to  Cc:yhan  on Turkey's 
16 Mediterranean coast. 
In this, Moscow's interests partly coincide with those of  Iran. With at least 
13  million  Azeris  concentrated in  its  north-western  provinces,  Iran  has 
apparently  no  desire  to  support the  Republic  of Azerbaijan.  Hence  the 
open communications, and cordial relations, Iran maintains with Armenia. 
It  too  objects  to  the  Baku-Ceyhan  project.  It  is  also  in  dispute  with 
Azerbaijan over the  territorial division of the  Caspian.  Thus,  as  the  oil 
comes on stream, the risk of involvement by powers outside the region is 
increasing. 
g)  The  recent  history  of negotiations  on  both  Abkhazia  and  Nagomo-
Karabagh  has  served  to  demonstrate  the  difficulty of "normalisation" 
(return of refugees, resumption of economic activity) without a settlement 
regarding political status questions and security guarantees for  returning 
refugees  and  IDPs,  as  well  as  for  the  ethnic  Armenian  or  Abkhazian 
populations. The refugee burden remains as heavy as it ever was. 
Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have given priority to  the  integration of 
refugees  into  the  population  at  large,  and  they  continue  to  seek 
international aid for their support. 
h)  There is a need to address pressing environmental problems, especially 
those affecting the Black and Caspian Seas. This is an important field for 
future regional cooperation, extending beyond the Caucasus itself. 
4.5.  It is  difficult to avoid the conclusion that the root of many, if not most of these 
problems facing the three republics are to be  linked to the continuing failure to 
resolve the ethnic conflicts. The present stalemate is not, in reality, a status quo. It 
institutionalises  an  abnormal  situation.  Borders  and  communications  remain 
closed.  1,5 million refugees continue to live in conditions of  extreme poverty and 
squalor.  Businesses  operate  under particularly difficult constraints,  and are  not 
able to access regional markets. Organised crime flourishes due to  shortages and 
interruptions of  supply. 
Apart from these economic questions, the existence of the conflicts preserves an 
effective  state  of emergency  which  in  tum  hampers  an  open  debate  on  the 
democratic institutions of state. There  are also concerns about emigration. Some 
of  the best brains in the region have left. 
Moreover, the inability of the three countries to break out of this vicious circle 
means that· they will continue to rely  upon international assistance; while at the 
same time, that assistance is less effective than it would be under more favourable 
circumstances. 
4.6.  In short, any policy which addresses only bilateral assistance issues and does not 
touch upon the source of the problems will not bring the "dividend" which PCA 
implementation  should  imply.  It follows  that  the  EU  will  need  to  fashion  its 
policy under the PCAs in such a way as to ensure that its actions and its assistance 
become an incentive for positive change. 
17 1: 









The importance of contractual relations 
5.1  For the first time, the PCAs offer the EC and its Member States a platfom1 from 
which  to  address  coherently  political,  economic  and  assistance-related issues. 
This will, inter alia, allow them to capitalise on the Community's instruments, in a 
way which was  not previously possible,  in order to  improve the  prospects for 
peace and enhanced regional cooperation. Initiatives such as Traceca, Inogate and 
in the telecommunications sector can be used to help break the log-jam of closed 
communications, frozen commercial activity and economic deprivation. 
Regional Cooperation and implications for conflict resolution 
5.2.  The  Community's  regional  cooperation  and  rehabilitation  instruments  are 
strongly supported at the highest level in ail three countries and currently offer the 
best  option  for  progress  on  economic  questions  and  for  confidence-building 
measures.  Their use would imply a broader EU  role in support of international 
efforts on conflict resolution and closer co-ordination between the Union's policy 
instruments under first and second "pillars". 
5.3.  This is necessary because although such measures cannot serve as alternatives to 
political  solutions  - they  can  only  complement  and  reinforce  international 
mediation through OSCE and UN -technical initiatives in the field of transport, 
energy  or  communication/networks  still  require  the  political  support of the 
Union. This can be expressed through the PCA mechanisms; but it would also be 
helpful if  the profile of such measures could be raised, within the CFSP, possibly 
through adopting a Common Position under Art. J.2. 
One option would be for the Union to discuss with the three republics, at political 
level, a timetable for the implementation of measures  such as those referred to in 
paras 3.7 and 3.8. 
5.4.  In meetings with the Prime Ministers of  the three republics in the margins of the 
Inogate  Conference,  in  February  1999,  the  Commission  reminded  them  that 
irrespective of  the arguments which the protagonists in the conflicts are well able 
to deploy, the Union needs to assess whether the will exists to make real progress 
in ending the  current stalemate.  The EU will inevitably take this into account 
when taking decisions on how to allocate increasingly scarce resources. The 22 
June Presidential meeting offers a prime opportunity for the three heads of  state to 
confirm this.  The EU needs to reinforce the  importance it attaches to  conflict 
resolution by sending a  clear political signal on the form the Community's 
assistance can be expected to take in the medium term. It could  concentrate on 
support programmes for the return of refugees to their places of origin through 
rehabilitation projects, and on the preparation of investment plans, as appropriate 
together with other international donors,  to  attract investors to former  conflict 
zones.  Another  objective  could  be  to  use  such  measures  to  ensure  the  full 
integration of those refugees and IDPs who do not seek to return to their original 
homes. 
18 5.5.  The  political dialogue foreseen under the PCAs contains a regional  dimension 
(Art. 4, final indent). This should be used as a framework for a concrete dialogue 
on the main themes of the South Caucasus's relationship with the EU.  Providing 
sufficient progress can be achieved in technical discussions and, in parallel, in the 
Minsk  Group  (Nagomo  Karabakh)  and  the  Geneva  Conference,  the  EU  could 
announce  its  readiness  to  discuss  possibilities  to  open  borders  and  increased 
market  access  in  the  region  with  the  three  republics.  As  appropriate,  Russia, 
Turkey and Iran could be included in this dialogue. 
5.6.  The EU should benefit from the synergies derived from linking its activities in the 
South Caucasus to those in Central Europe, the Balkans and the Black Sea area 
generally. The agreements sponsored by Traceca and Inogate, the development of 
a Pan-European Transport Area (PETrA)  in the Black Sea, the  Energy Charter 
Treaty,  links between the EU  and  BSEC and initiatives such as the Black Sea 
Regional Energy Centre can all play a role in achieving this. 
Bilateral cooperation 
5. 7.  The  institutions established under the PC As  should move quickly to define the 
principal  priorities  for  longer-term  bilateral  cooperation.  These  should  include 
projects  aimed  at  improving  financial  and  fiscal  management,  administrative 
efficiency, and the business climate.  Relevant to all these, but above all to the 
"essential elements" underlying each PCA, is the strengthening of  the rule of law. 
This is a sine qua non for the development of the EU's relations with the partner 
countries to evolve into multi-faceted "two way"  relationships as foreseen in the 
Agreements. The new "Tacis" regulation will be the key vehicle for these longer-
term projects. 
5.8.  Given the very difficult economic and social conditions in the South Caucasus, 
the  Community  should  continue  to  respond  to  the  needs  of the  region  in  a 
sensitive and adaptable way.  It is important that the EC should in the short term 
continue to use  the assistance  instruments at  its disposal to  reinforce economic 
and  political  stability in  the  three  republics,  since without this  it will  be  very 
difficult  to  make  progress,  either  on  regional  cooperation  or  on post-conflict 
reconstruction.  However,  the  objective  must  remain  that  of moving  steadily 
towards balanced relationships based primarily on trade and investment, including 
further administrative reforms and reform of  the financial services. 
5. 9.  Regarding the  further  reform of democratic institutions and  strengthening the 
rule of law, the objective of technical assistance should be to help each republic 
to  develop,  as· a  priority,  a  fully  independent  judiciary  and  a  powerful  and 
independent  audit  body.  The  EC  should  strongly  urge  partners  to  roll  back 
government control of  commercial operations and to "contract out" administrative 
activities wherever there is any doubt that they can be carried out in an impartial 
and  effective way.  It should play a more  consistent and  higher profile role  in 
election observation, in cooperation with ODIHR. 
This should be complemented by the dialogue between the European Parliament· 
and  the  Parliaments  of  each  of  the  partners,  through  the  Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committees. 
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5.10.  The  EU  should use  the  Cooperation  Council  and  Committees  to  reinforce  the 
European Policy and Legal Advice Centres and their role in promoting EC and 
international norms. 
5  .11.  The PCA institutions should be used to  reinforce the message that improvemer;. 
of  the business climate has very high political priority, and that more efforts musl 
he made to set the right conditions to attract private investment. 
5  .12.  Energy is an important factor for integration, through the development of  regional 
markets  and  the  realisation  of the  Caspian  Basin's  export  potential.  The  Ell 
should  continue  to  pay  particular  attention  to  the  promotion  of international 
cooperation in this domain. 
The  Community  should  help  to  draw  up  a  comprehensive  strategy,  including 
financing  aspects, which should lead to  the  closure of the  Medzamor nuclear 
power station in Armenia, by the year 2004. It should if  possible seek to define a 
regional plan,  with other national  or international donors,  which would ensure 
access  to  alternative  energy  sources.  An  EC-Armenia  Working  Group  is 
mandated with this task. 
EU  policies,  not least in the energy  sector,  must take  into  account the  fragile 
environmental balance in the region,  especially in coastal zones.  Thus, bilateral 
and regional  cooperation initiatives should be developed with due regard to the 
principles of environmental protection and to the region's specific needs (Art.  55 
ofthe PCAs). 
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